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PRIVATE PARTIES AND THE FFDCA: HOW
CREATIVE LITIGANTS HAVE CIRCUMVENTED
SECTION 310 AND UNDERMINED THE NLEA’S
EXPRESS PREEMPTION AMENDMENTS
By Joe Dages+
“[T]he way we eat represents our most profound engagement with the
natural world. Daily, our eating turns nature into culture, transforming the
body of the world into our bodies and minds.” 1 Individuals are deeply
connected to the food they consume. 2 This connection creates a justifiable
interest in knowing what is in one’s food and ensuring that food is responsibly
labeled and subject to appropriate consumer protection by the government.3
However, increased regulation can impose costs on industry and consumers.4
Food companies face a labrynthian regulatory scheme governing the labeling
of food and beverage products. 5 Under the current scheme, multiple
government actors have overlapping jurisdiction over food labeling. 6 This
+
+ J.D. candidate, May 2014, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law;
B.A., 2006, Wheaton College. The author wishes to thank Maile Hermida for her thoughtful help
and feedback in reviewing this comment. In addition, the author wishes to thank the staff of the
Catholic University Law Review whose edits undoubtedly improved this comment.
1. MICHAEL POLLAN, THE OMNIVORE’S DILEMMA: A NATURAL HISTORY OF FOUR
MEALS 10 (2006).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 10–11.
4. See, e.g., Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling of Beef, Pork, Lamb, Chicken, Goat
Meat, Wild and Farm-Raised Fish and Shellfish, Perishable Agricultural Commodities, Peanuts,
Pecans, Ginseng, and Macadamia Nuts, 74 Fed. Reg. 2658, 2669–71 (Jan. 15, 2009) (codified at 7
C.F.R. pts. 60 and 65) (discussing the multitude of comments from industry indicating that
mandating Country of Origin Labeling (COOL) for meat products would greatly increase costs
for manufacturers and consumers); see also Elaine Watson, DEFRA: Changing Labels Costs
“Substantially” More Than We Thought, FOOD MANUFACTURE (Dec. 9, 2010),
http://www.foodmanufacture.co.uk/Packaging/DEFRA-Changing-labels-costs-substantially-more
-than-we-thought?utm_source=copyright&utm_medium=OnSite&utm_campaign=copyright.
The author discusses the findings of a study conducted on behalf of the British government,
which found that merely mandating COOL on food products could significantly increase costs for
manufacturers to accurately account for the origin of each ingredient in complex food products
consisting of several ingredients. Id.
5. See, e.g., Ensuring Safe Food: from Production to Consumption, Nat’l Acad of
Sciences, 25, (1998). The National Academy of Sciences explained that “[t]he food safety system
in this country is complex and multilevel,” and “essentially uncoordinated.” Id. The Academy
notes that, “[a]s a consequence, the government’s role is also complex, fragmented, and in many
ways uncoordinated.” Id. See also NEAL D. FORTIN, FOOD REGULATION, 23–32 (2009)
(discussing the large number of agencies that exert jurisdiction over regulating the food and
beverage industry and how that jurisdiction overlaps).
6. See FORTIN, supra note 5, at 23–32 (listing the multitude of government entities with
jurisidiction over various, frequently overlapping, aspects of the food and beverage industry).
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overlap in jurisdiction creates uncertainty about whether a private litigant can
enforce federal food labeling laws through actions in state courts.7 California,
by virtue of its strong consumer protection statutes, stands at the forefront of a
litigation laboratory where courts have struggled with labeling law issues in
recent cases, such as Pom Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co. and In re Farm
Raised Salmon Cases.8
At first glance, it may seem as though the goals of consumers conflict with
those of food manufacturers.9 A deeper examination, however, reveals that
consumers and food companies want the same regulatory environment: a
system that ensures food is safe, labels are honest so as to foster competition in
the marketplace, and food remains affordable.10 Attempting to achieve this
regulatory balance has continuously vexed Congress, courts, executive
agencies, and state governments. 11 Therefore, to provide legal clarity and
promote the mutual interests of consumers and manufacturers, Congress
should prohibit private litigants from bringing lawsuits in state courts if the
underlying facts supporting the claim rely on product labeling information that
is subject to express preemption under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (FFDCA).12

7. See infra notes 13–24 and corresponding text.
8. See Pom Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 679 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2012); In re Farm
Raised Salmon Cases, 175 P.3d 1170 (Cal. 2008).
9. For example, in Physicians Comm. for Responsible Med. v. Glickman, a variety of
consumer and health groups brought suit against the United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA) in 2000, alleging the Department failed to protect the public by catering to the interests
of the food industry by developing an advisory committee that did not adequately represent their
views. 117 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2000).
10. See, e.g., About GMA: For Consumers, GROCERY MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION,
http://www.gmaonline.org/about/for-consumers/ (last visited July 21, 2013) (stating that, “its
members are committed to ensuring that consumers have safe, healthy food and grocery options.
. . . GMA and its members are constantly working to provide consumers with helpful,
easy-to-understand and essential information about grocery products and nutrition”). The
Grocery Manufacturers Association (GMA) is a trade association representing the largest food
and beverage companies in the country.
About GMA, GROCERY MFRS. ASS’N,
http://www.gmaonline.org/about/ (last visited July 21, 2013).
11. See Emily J. Schaffer, Is the Fox Guarding the Henhouse? Who Makes the Rules in
American Nutrition Policy?, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 371, 371–72 (2002) (“Legal scholarship,
however, has failed to develop a comprehensive theory of the proper role for government in the
area of food regulation and public nutrition. Indeed, a close look at U.S. nutrition policy at the
dawn of the twenty-first century reveals not a ‘coordinated, comprehensive set of policy
directives,’ but rather a collection of distinct programs that affect, in a variety of ways, food
production, consumption, and regulation.”). The author further explains that “[t]he patchwork
nature of nutrition policy can be partially attributed to the complexity of the interests that
government has sought to protect, the diversity of goals it has aimed to achieve, and substantial
confusion and disagreement over the proper nature and scope of governmental intervention.” Id.
12. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2006 & Supp.
2012).
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State regulation of food products has roots stretching back to the eighteenth
century,13 long before the federal government passed its first food safety act in
1906.14 The power to regulate in-state police activities that have a bearing on
health and safety is reserved for the states.15 States have historically chosen to
exercise this power by enacting statutes designed to regulate food
manufacturers’ labeling claims.16 California, widely considered to be a leading
state on matters involving consumer protection, has been particularly active in
developing a variety of legal mechanisms for policing the food industry.17 On
a timeline running roughly concurrent to that of federal efforts, California
enacted several statutes aimed at food labeling and consumer protection,
including the Sherman Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Law (Sherman Law), the
13. See FORTIN, supra note 5, at 4 (noting that Massachusetts passed food laws banning the
sale of “unwholesome” foods as early at 1785). An implied warranty of wholesomeness has long
been part of United States common law since at least 1815. See Harry C.W. Melick, The Sale of
Food and Drink, 17 (Prentice-Hall 1936) (citing Van Bracklin v. Fonda, 12 Johns. 468 (N.Y.
1815)) (referencing an inference made by the author based on dictum in the court’s opinion that
suggests “there was an implied warranty of wholesomeness”).
14. See Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59–384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906).
15. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (stating that “[t]here are, however,
certain powers, existing in the sovereignty of each state in the Union, somewhat vaguely termed
police powers . . . [that] relate to the safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the public.”)
overruled on other grounds by Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) (“The doctrine that
prevailed in Lochner . . . and like cases—that due process authorizes courts to hold laws
unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely—has long since been
discarded.”); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 657–59, 663–64 (1887) (discussing the right of
states to regulate and ban the sale of intoxicating liquors to promote the general welfare); Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 135–36 (1876) (upholding an Illinois law providing for the inspection of
grain warehouses on grounds the state was acting within its police powers).
16. See Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly, 95 P.3d 422, 431–32 (Cal. 2004) (discussing various state
laws enacted in Wisconsin, Maryland, Ohio, and New York designed to prohibit manufacturers’
claims that could mislead consumers).
17. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.6 (West 2006) (providing that, “[n]o
person in the course of doing business shall knowingly and intentionally expose any individual to
a chemical known to the state to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity without first giving clear
and reasonable warning to such individual”). Another section of the statute, known as
Proposition 65 requires California’s Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment to
publish a list of chemicals known to the state to cause cancer. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 25249.8. Proposition 65, also provides for a private right of action, which allows “any person
in the state to bring suit under the Act, and permits the award of money damages for violations.”
See Baylen J. Linnekin, The “California Effect” & the Future of American Food: How
California’s Growing Crackdown on Food & Agriculture Harms the State & the Nation, 13
Chap. L. Rev. 357, 369 (2010) (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 3000–3204 (2003)).
This statutory framework has created prolific litigation against a variety of industries for failing to
adequately warn consumers of risks. See Linnekin, supra, at 369–70 (discussing the multitude of
Proposition 65 lawsuits filed against food manufacturers in California for failure to warn despite
the fact that Prop 65 was never intended to apply to food and beverages); see also Clifford
Rechtschaffen, The Warning Game: Evaluating Warnings Under California’s Proposition 65, 23
Ecology L.Q. 303, 305–06 (1996) (discussing the purpose of Proposition 65 and noting that
“[p]roposition 65 represents the most ambitious attempt by a state to regulate hazardous chemical
exposure through information disclosure rather than direct mandate”).
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Unfair Competition Law (UCL), the False Advertising Law (FAL), and the
Consumers Legal Remedy Act (CLRA).18
Unlike the California statutes mentioned above, section 310 of the FFDCA
contains a provision limiting who may enforce the act: “[e]xcept as provided in
subsection (b) of this section, all such proceedings for the enforcement, or to
restrain violations, of [the FFDCA] shall be by and in the name of the United
States.”19 This provision prevents private parties from bringing suit under the
FFDCA. 20 In addition, section 403A(a) of the FFDCA includes several
preemption provisions that require state labeling laws to be identical to some
of the federal standards articulated in the FFDCA’s statutory provisions and
implementing regulations.21 The identical language of these state provisions
present an important question: can creative private litigants bring lawsuits
inherently predicated on information regulated under the FFDCA but facially
pleaded under a state statutory or regulatory provision?
Recent litigation in the California Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit
exemplifies how courts have struggled with this question.22 The California
Supreme Court ruled in the In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases that private
18. Sherman Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Law, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 109875 et
seq. (West 2012); Unfair Competition Law, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2008);
False Advertising Law, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (West 2008); Consumers Legal
Remedy Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750, 1760 & 1770(a)(1)–(22) (West 2009 & Supp. 2013).
19. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 § 310, 21 U.S.C. § 337 (2006)
[hereinafter FFDCA]. The FDA has jurisdiction over the enforcement of labeling violations
under the FFDCA, but the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has jurisdiction over
advertising-related infringement. See Federal Trade Comm’n, Enforcement Policy Statement on
Food Advertising, May 1994, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-food.shtm
(“Since 1954, the FTC and the FDA have operated under a Memorandum of Understanding,
under which the Commission has assumed primary responsibility for regulating food advertising,
while FDA has taken primary responsibility for regulating food labeling.”). Determining what
constitutes a label and what constitutes advertising is a complicated topic that is beyond the scope
of this Comment. This Comment concentrates on food labeling violations under the FDA’s
enforcement jurisdiction and not advertisement violations under the FTC’s jurisdiction.
20. See Animal Legal Def. Fund Boston, Inc. v. Provimi Veal Corp., 626 F. Supp. 278, 283
(D. Mass. 1986), aff’d, 802 F.2d 440 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding the private litigants could not bring
suit under the FFDCA); Nat’l Women’s Health Network, Inc. v. A. H. Robins Co., Inc., 545 F.
Supp. 1177, 1178 (D. Mass. 1982) (stating “I have no difficulty in holding that no private right of
action can be implied under the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act”); State of Fla. ex rel.
Broward County v. Eli Lilly & Co., 329 F. Supp. 364, 366–67 (S.D. Fla. 1971) (ruling that the
State of Florida could not bring suit to enforce the FFDCA where the defendant drug company
allegedly failed to properly warn consumers). Section 310(b), however, does provide for limited
enforcement of FFDCA provisions by state authorities if the food in question is located within the
confines of the state. FFDCA § 310(b), 21 U.S.C. § 337(b).
21. FFDCA § 403A(a)(1)–(5), 21 U.S.C. §§ 343–1(a)(1)–(5) (2006 & Supp. 2012). This
language was added to the FFDCA in 1990 with the passage of the Nutritional Labeling and
Education Act (NLEA). Nutritional Labeling and Education Act, Pub. L. No. 101–535, 104 Stat
2353 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
22. In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, 175 P.3d 1170 (Cal. 2008); Pom Wonderful LLC v.
Coca-Cola Co., 679 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2012).
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parties were not barred from enforcing state law provisions that arguably fall
under the preemptive purview of the FFDCA.23 Just four years later, the Ninth
Circuit held in Pom Wonderful LLC that claims based on the Lanham Act,
which protects merchants and consumers from unfair competition, were
preempted by the FFDCA.24
This Comment begins by discussing the existing federal statutes that govern
food labeling, specifically the FFDCA and the Nutritional Labeling and
Education Act (NLEA). Special attention will be paid to the legislative history
of the FFDCA and NLEA provisions that relate to the preemption of state laws
and those that govern food colorings and product ingredient composition
claims. The relevant provisions of the Lanham Act will also be briefly
examined.
Next, this Comment reviews states’ rights under the constitutional “police
powers” doctrine in the context of food labeling. The discussion then turns to
the curious relationship between the FFDCA, the Lanham Act, and various
state statutes—in particular the Sherman Law, the UCL, the FAL, and the
CLRA. The court decisions in In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases and Pom
Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co. will be discussed to highlight the difficulty
courts have in understanding and applying federal and state laws relating to
food labeling and consumer protection.
Finally, this Comment suggests that, although the current legal landscape in
this arena may seem reconcilable, case law demonstrates that this body of law
is burdened with irregularities and inconsistencies and reveals a judicial split in
interpreting the preemptive nature of the FFDCA. Such a paradigm of
enforcement creates an unnecessarily confusing environment that courts,
consumers, and businesses struggle to apply and comply with. Therefore, this
Comment argues that Congress should prohibit private entity lawsuits if the
underlying facts supporting the claim rely on product labeling information that
is subject to express preemption under the FFDCA.

23. See In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, 175 P.3d at 1184 (holding the FFDCA does not
preempt state law claims predicated on disclosure requirements identical to the provisions of
section 403A).
24. Pom Wonderful, 679 F.3d at 1176. The Pom Wonderful court remanded the state law
claims, leaving the determination as to whether the claims could proceed to the district court. Id.
at 1178–79. At the time the District Court issued its opinion, it was unclear if one needed to be
eligible for restitution in order to bring suit under California’s UCL and FAL. Id. However, the
Pom Wonderful court explained that this question was subsequently settled by the California
Supreme Court in Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court and Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc.. Id. at 1178–79
(citing Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 246 P.3d 877, 895 (Cal. 2011); Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc.,
233 P.3d 1066, 1088 (Cal. 2010) (noting that standing under the UCL & FAL does not depend on
eligibility for restitution).
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I. A LARGE BODY OF EXISTING AND LARGELY OVERLAPPING LAW GOVERNS
FOOD LABELING, ADVERTISING, AND MARKETING
A. Relevant Federal Laws Regulating Food Labeling, Advertising, and
Marketing
1. The 1938 Version of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
Before Congress passed the FFDCA in 1938, the Pure Food and Drug Act of
1906 was the primary statute governing the regulation of food. 25 In 1933
Congress recognized that rapid advances in technology and commerce had
rendered the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 outdated.26 Congress still spent
over five years considering various versions of what eventually became the
FFDCA. 27 Congress passed the FFDCA largely due to concerns that the
country lacked a uniform approach to branding, marketing, and selling food.28
25. See Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59–384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906).
Congressional action to pass the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 was spurred, at least in part, by
Upton Sinclair’s gruesome accounts of meat packing facilities in Chicago in the famed novel The
Jungle. See Sheryl Lawrence, Comment, What Would You Do with A Fluorescent Green Pig?:
How Novel Transgenic Products Reveal Flaws in the Foundational Assumptions for the
Regulation of Biotechnology, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 201, 213–14 (2007). Food safety testing was
particularly unpleasant in the early days of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) when
government officials tested food by having volunteers consume items suspected to be poisonous.
See FORTIN, supra note 5, at 5.
26. See S. 1944, 73rd Cong. (1933); Food, Drugs and Cosmetics: Hearing on S. 1944
Before the S. Subcomm. on Commerce, 73rd Cong. 11 (1933) (statement of Hon. Henry A.
Wallace, Sec’y of Agriculture) (“The Food and Drugs Act of 1906 was something of an
innovation in Federal legislation. . . . But present day conditions in the food and drug business are
very different from what they were more than a quarter century ago.”). Senator Copeland’s food
safety bill, introduced on June 12, 1933, included several new sections not codified under current
law at that time, including a section prohibiting false advertising of food and beverage products.
S. 1944 §§ 9(a)–(b). President Franklin Roosevelt also expressed the need for reform, noting in a
letter to Congress that, “[n]o comprehensive attempt at reform in the regulation of commerce in
food and drugs has been made since 1906. I need not point out to you how much has happened
since that time . . . . A measure is needed which will extend the controls formerly applicable only
to labels to advertising.” MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: A
RECOMMENDATION FOR LEGISLATION TO EFFECT A REFORM IN THE REGULATION OF
COMMERCE IN FOOD AND DRUGS, H.R. DOC. NO. 74–142, at 1–2 (1935).
27. As noted above, Senator Copeland first introduced a food safety bill on June 12, 1933.
See supra note 26. The FFDCA did not become law until June 25, 1938. Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.
(2006 & Supp. 2012)).
28. See 81 CONG. REC. 7312 (1937) (statement of Rep. Coffee). Representative Coffee
stated
[a]n outstanding weakness of the [Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906] is its failure to
provide for supervision of advertising. . . . Advertising has become such an important
factor in determining the buying habits of the public that the need for honest
advertising, as well as for honest labeling, is now almost universally recognized.
Id.; see also 81 CONG. REC. A321 (1937) (statement of Rep. O’Day) (describing the need for the
federal government to establish uniform labeling, marketing, and quality standards); H.R. REP.
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Most notably, the FFDCA vested enforcement powers in the federal
government.29 In addition, the FFDCA broadened the definition of “food,” to
enlarge the government’s scope of jurisdiction. 30 Consistent with its
underlying purpose, the law also attempted to strengthen provisions prohibiting
the misbranding of food.31
Another notable provision of the FFDCA called for new uniform labeling of
food products, which requires inclusion of the following information: “(1) the
‘common or usual name’ of the food; (2) the net quantity of contents; and (3)
the name and address of the manufacturer, packager, or distributor.”32 The
FFDCA also established standards of identity for common foods. 33 The
purpose of this provision was to promote truthfulness for the benefit of
consumers.34 The law directed the FDA to “promulgate regulations fixing and
establishing for any food, under its common or usual name so far as

NO. 75–2139, at 3 (1938) (letter of Hon. Henry A. Wallace, Sec’y of Agriculture) (noting that the
“clear intent of [the FFDCA] is to close the channels of interstate commerce to food, drugs,
cosmetics, and devices that are adulterated or misbranded.”).
29. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75–717, § 307, 52 Stat. 1040, 1046
(1938).
30. § 201(f), 52 Stat. at 1040 (defining food as “(1) articles used for food or drink for man
or other animals, (2) chewing gum, and (3) articles used for components of any such article.”).
31. § 403, 52 STAT. at 1047 (providing the circumstances under which a food is deemed
misbranded). At least one author has implied, however, the misbranding section of the FFDCA
could have been broadened. See Gail H. Javitt, Supersizing The Pint-Sized: The Need for
FDA-Mandated Child-Oriented Food Labeling, 39 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 311, 317 n.42, 318 (2006)
(comparing the FFDCA’s misbranding provisions with the Pure Food and Drug Act’s
misbranding provisions and noting that “the authority granted was conditional, and therefore
limited”); see also Frederick H. Degnan, The Food Label and the Right-to-Know, 52 Food & Drug
L.J. 49, 51–53 (1997) (noting that “[t]he wording of the section . . . reveals that Congress was
concerned that this provision be applied carefully and with good judgment” and that the FDA has
limited the information that must be provided to consumers “to that necessary to accurately
identify the basic nature” of the food).
32. JAVITT, supra, note 31 at 317; see also Claudia L. André, Comment, What’s in That
Guacamole? How Bates and the Power of Preemption Will Affect Litigation Against the Food
Industry, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 227, 230 (2007) (noting that, “[a] major component of the
[FFDCA] was to provide ‘informative labeling’ to the public, especially for food items that would
affect those who could not take care of themselves, such as infants”).
33. 21 U.S.C. § 341 (2006 & Supp. 2012). The regulations promulgated to develop the
standards of identity are set forth in 21 C.F.R. §§ 130 to 169 (2012).
34. See Fed. Sec. Adm’r v. Quaker Oats Co., 318 U.S. 218, 229 (1943) (discussing
regulatory framework which requires FDA to promulgate standards of identity to promote
“honesty and fair dealing”); see also United States v. An Article of Food Consisting of 126 Cases,
More or Less, Each Containing 12 Three-Pound Jars, Labeled: (Case & Jar) “Pure Raw Honey
Packed For J.G. Samples,” 550 F. Supp. 15, 19 (W.D. Okla. 1982) (noting that standards of
identity protect consumers from economic adulteration and allow them to make informed
decisions in selecting food).
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practicable, a reasonable definition and standard of identity.”35 Standards of
identity have been promulgated for a wide range of products.36
2. Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 and the Amendments to the
FFDCA
Although some portions of the FFDCA remain codified in their original
form, 37 much of the statute has been amended over the years. 38 Several
subsequent congressional acts have nevertheless focused on preserving many
of the core motivations behind the FFDCA by strengthening the labeling
provisions and consumer protection goals of the 1938 Act.39 Of particular note
is the NLEA, which strengthened the FDA’s regulatory authority over health
and nutrient claims and mandated more detailed labeling requirements for
manufacturers of food products.40
35. FFDCA § 401, 21 U.S.C. § 341 (2006). Standards of identity have been subjected to
considerable and often narrowly focused legal scholarship. See John Agar, Generally Recognized
As Sour Cream: Treating Standards of Food Identity as a Success, 44 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J.
237, 247 (1989) (noting that the statutory and regulatory framework for developing standards of
identity is adequately flexible for society’s needs); Christopher Chen, Food and Drug
Administration Food Standards of Identity: Consumer Protection Through the Regulation of
Product Information, 47 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 185, 199–201 (1992) (discussing the benefits of
standards of identity from a consumer oriented perspective); Richard A. Merrill & Earl M.
Collier, Jr., “Like Mother Used to Make”: An Analysis of FDA Food Standards of Identity, 74
COLUM. L. REV. 561, 562 (1974) (providing an in-depth overview of FDA’s authority to
promulgate standards of identity and conducting a cost-benefit analysis of issuing standards of
identity).
36. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 130 to 169 (2012). Standards of identity are developed by the FDA,
however, food manufacturers who believe the standards developed are unfair or overly
burdensome may challenge the standard. See Nat’l Nutritional Foods Ass’n v. Food & Drug
Admin., 504 F.2d 761, 806 (2d Cir. 1974) (evaluating a challenge to the scope of standards of
identity for vitamins and minerals); see also Corn Prod. Co. v. Dep’t of Health, Ed. & Welfare,
Food & Drug Admin., 427 F.2d 511, 513, 517 (3d Cir. 1970) (finding that a standard of identity
that is supported by substantial evidence, which comports with the established practices of other
manufacturers, and that will not impose undue economic hardship, shall be upheld).
37. For example, the definition of food has never been amended. See FFDCA § 201(f), 21
U.S.C. § 321(f) (2006).
38. See Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105–115,
111 Stat. 2296 (1997) (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.) (amending the FDA’s food
contact material pre-market approval requirements); FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub.
L. No. 111–353, 124 Stat. 3885 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.) (enacting
sweeping food safety reforms that place an emphasis on prevention rather than reaction); see also
Significant Amendments to the FD & C Act, UNITED STATES FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION,
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Legislation/FederalFoodDrugandCosmeticActFFDC
Act/SignificantAmendmentstotheFFDCAct/default.htm (last visited July 30, 2013) (listing no
fewer than twenty-four significant amendments to the FFDCA since 1980 alone).
39. See JAVITT, supra note 31, at 319–20 nn. 55–56 (discussing amendments to the FFDCA
after 1938 that expanded the scope of the FDA’s authority concerning consumer protection).
40. Nutritional Labeling and Education Act, Pub. L. No. 101–535, 104 Stat 2353 (1990)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.) (2006 & Supp. 2012). President George
H.W. Bush, upon signing the NLEA, noted that the Act made “two significant changes” to law:
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Congress passed the NLEA during a time when the legislature believed that
health and nutrient claims made by manufacturers of food and beverage
products were not accurate41 and that the nutrition disclosure requirements for
these products were too lax.42 When passing the NLEA, Congress noted that
the FDA was too slow in reforming the regulations controlling health and
nutrient claims.43 At the time, at least some in Congress believed it was unfair
and burdensome to require manufacturers to comply with standards and
regulations that varied from state to state because this variance would result in
the practical implication of forcing the manufacturers to label products
differently in every state.44 Senator Hatch noted that “inconsistent State and
local laws seriously disrupt food manufacturing and distribution, resulting in
higher prices for consumers, . . .[and] frustrate food safety and nutrition
education efforts by presenting consumers with varying and inconsistent
information and warnings.” 45 Some in Congress believed that a uniform
federal labeling policy that preempted state labeling laws was essential “to
make order out of chaos in the regulation of food and to give consumers
confidence in place of uncertainty.”46 But Congress also recognized that states
traditionally play a role in the regulatory oversight of the food industry, noting
that, “the States should never be preempted unless a strong Federal regulatory
system is in place.”47

(1) “requir[ing] food manufacturers to include more nutrition information on their labels” and (2)
“prohibit[ing] food manufacturers from making health claims on their labels unless the claims are
permitted by the Department of Health and Human Services.” Statement On Signing the
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1585 (Nov. 8, 1990). After the
NLEA was passed the FDA promulgated a number of regulations covering health and nutrient
claims. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. §§ 101.13, 101.54 – 101.69 (2012) (covering nutrient content claims
for a number of terms, including but not limited to, “high”, “light”, and “good source”); 21 C.F.R.
§ 101.14(a)(1) (2012) (providing that in order for a health claim to be made, a relationship must
exist between an ingredient in the food and a disease or health condition).
41. See H.R. REP. NO. 538 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3337–39.
42. Id. The existing regulations only required disclosure of nutritional information when a
health claim was made. Id. at 3338.
43. Id. (noting that it had taken the FDA eleven years to update the food labeling regulations
and that no final regulations were ever published).
44. See 136 CONG. REC. 16610–11 (Oct. 24, 1990) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
Representative Waxman also noted that the NLEA provisions providing for federal preemption of
state labeling and health claims have “particular appeal” under the law as the food and beverage
industry would have great difficulty in complying with state labeling and marketing laws. See
136 CONG. REC. 20418 (July, 30 1990) (statement of Rep. Waxman).
45. 136 CONG. REC. 16611 (Oct. 24, 1990) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
46. Id.
47. 136 CONG. REC. 20418 (July 30, 1990) (statement of Rep. Waxman). Rep. Waxman,
however, was also sensitive to the need for uniformity and preemption of state laws touching on
food labeling, noting that “numerous conflicting and inconsistent State and local [food labeling]
laws” would make it “difficult and even impossible for companies to operate in interstate
commerce.” Id.
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Against this backdrop, Congress enacted provisions in the NLEA that
require manufacturers of food products to provide detailed information about
the nutritional content of products sold.48 The Act also vested the FDA with
discretionary authority to determine what information must appear on labels.49
To implement the law, the FDA issued food-labeling regulations detailing the
information that must appear on the nutrition facts panel.50 The NLEA also
expanded section 310 of the FFDCA to provide states with the ability to
initiate legal actions for FFDCA violations so long as the non-compliant
product was located within the confines of the state.51
The NLEA also includes several noteworthy provisions under a section titled
“National Uniform Nutrition Labeling.”52 This section articulates the NLEA’s
provisions preempting state labeling requirements, which require all state laws
covering products subject to a standard of identity53 and the disclosure of food
colorings54 to be identical to their federal labeling law counterparts. Finally,
Congress also responded to concerns over the need to continue enabling states
to possess consumer protection powers by requiring the Secretary of Health
and Human Services to conduct a study exploring the extent to which the
NLEA would conflict with state labeling laws.55

48. FFDCA § 403(q), 21 U.S.C. § 343(q) (2006 & Supp. 2012).
49. Id. For instance, in enacting these more stringent labeling requirements, the NLEA
allows the FDA to remove information relating to a nutrient if such information “is not necessary
to assist consumers in maintaining healthy dietary practices.” FFDCA § 403(q)(2)(B), 21 U.S.C.
§ 343(g).
50. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 101 et seq. (2012).
51. FFDCA § 310(b), 21 U.S.C. §§ 337(b) (2006).
52. FFDCA §§ 403A(a)(1)–(5), 21 U.S.C. §§ 343–1(a)(1)–(5).
53. FFDCA § 403A(a)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 343–1(a)(1). Specifically, this section provides:
no State or political subdivision of a State may directly or indirectly establish under any
authority or continue in effect as to any food in interstate commerce—
(1) any requirement for a food which is the subject of a standard of identity established
under section 341 of this title that is not identical to such standard of identity or that is
not identical to the requirement of section 343(g) of this title
Id.
54. FFDCA § 403A(a)(3), 21 U.S.C. § 343–1(a). Specifically, this section provides:
no State or political subdivision of a State may directly or indirectly establish under any
authority or continue in effect as to any food in interstate commerce—
(3) any requirement for the labeling of food of the type required by section 343(b),
343(d), 343(f), 343(h), 343(i)(1), or 343(k) of this title that is not identical to the
requirement of such section
FFDCA § 403A(a)(3), 21 U.S.C. § 343–1(a).
55. Nutritional Labeling and Education Act, Pub. L. No. 101–535, § 403A(b), 104 Stat
2353, 2364 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).

2013]

Private Parties and the FFDCA

1071

3. The Lanham Act
The stated purpose of the Lanham Act, also known as the Trademark Act of
1946, 56 is “to protect persons engaged in [] commerce against unfair
competition.”57 The Lanham Act provides for two major causes of action: one
against unregistered trademark infringement and another against product
disparagement.58 Curiously, the drafters of the Act did not envision section
43(a) of the Act, which is codified at section 1125(a) of title 15, as particularly
important.59 However, today it serves as the primary means by which private
entities may bring suit for false advertising in a wide variety of contexts.60
The Lanham Act enables any individual who believes that he or she will be
damaged by another entity’s false or misleading product advertising to bring
suit against that entity and to seek civil damages. 61 This section has been
56. Lanham Act, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq. (2006
& Supp. 2012)).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006); see also Elizabeth Williams, Annotation, Standing to Bring
False Advertising Claim or Unfair Competition Claim Under § 43(a)(1) of Lanham Act (15 USCS
§ 1125(a)(1)), 124 A.L.R. FED. 189, 204 (1995) (explaining the purpose of the Lanham Act). The
drafters of the Act wanted to create a uniform federal law for unfair competition due to the belief
current federal unfair competition law prior to 1946 was weakened by court actions. J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, 5 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 27:7 (4th ed. 2012).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2006); see also J. Thomas McCarthy, Lanham Act
§ 43(a): The Sleeping Giant Is Now Wide Awake, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 45–46 (1996)
(discussing the two prongs of Section 43(a) claims).
59. MCCARTHY, supra note 57, at § 27:7 (noting that at the time of the Lanham Act’s
passage, § 43(a) was viewed as a “minor” section); see also Joseph P. Bauer, A Federal Law of
Unfair Competition: What Should Be the Reach of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act?, 31 UCLA
L. REV. 671, 679 (1984) (stating the legislative history of the Lanham Act’s Section 43(a) is quite
limited because the drafters did not view it as important).
60. McCarthy, supra note 58, at 45; see Hot Wax, Inc. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 191 F.3d 813,
820 (7th Cir. 1999) (discussing the requirements a plaintiff must show to bring a false advertising
claim under the Lanham Act). The Ninth Circuit happens to hear a considerable number of
Lanham Act false advertising claims from the entertainment industry. See, e.g., Waits v. Frito
-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1108 (9th Cir. 1992) (listing the standing requirements for Lanham Act
claim for voice impersonation); Halicki v. United Artists Commc’ns, Inc., 812 F.2d 1213,
1213–14 (9th Cir. 1987) (analyzing false advertising claims in the entertainment industry
context); Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 603–04 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding a Lanham Act claim
valid for false advertising where purveyors of a motion picture removed the name of actor in a
film). But see Alfred Dunhill Ltd. v. Interstate Cigar Co., Inc., 499 F.2d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1974)
(noting that the Lanham Act’s false advertising provisions were meant to have some limitations in
applicability).
61. Section 1125(a)(1)(B) provides:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container
for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description
of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which— . . .
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics,
qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or
commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that
he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
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interpreted to require a plaintiff to show the following elements in order to
state a false advertising claim:
(1) that the defendant made a false statement of fact about its product
in a commercial advertisement; (2) that the statement actually
deceived or has a tendency to deceive a substantial segment of its
audience; (3) the deception is likely to influence the purchasing
decision; (4) the defendant caused the false statement to enter
interstate commerce; and (5) the plaintiff[] ha[s] or is likely to be
injured as a result.62
Complainants who successfully invoke the protection of the Lanham Act are
entitled to a variety of remedies, including damages, injunctive relief, and
attorney’s fees.63
B. Federal Preemption of State Laws
1. State Police Powers
It has been settled law for more than a century that the powers reserved to
the states include certain “police powers” that permit the state to regulate those
issues having a bearing on health, safety, morals, and general welfare. 64
Where Congress intends to preempt a state law touching upon these powers, it

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).
62. Logan v. Burgers Ozark Country Cured Hams Inc., 263 F.3d 447, 462 (5th Cir. 2001).
63. The Lanham Act provides for treble damages in counterfeit actions. 15 U.S.C. § 1117
(2006 & Supp. 2012); see also Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480, 1495 (11th Cir.
1983) (noting that the court may award treble damages at its discretion); Procter & Gamble Co. v.
Haugen, 627 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1302–04 (D. Utah 2008) (holding an award of twenty million
dollars in damages for false advertising in violation of the Lanham Act was appropriate).
Injunctive relief may also be awarded at the discretion of the court under the Lanham Act. 15
U.S.C. § 1116 (2006 & Supp. 2012); see also Black Hills Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. Gold Rush, Inc.,
633 F.2d 746, 750 (8th Cir. 1980) (finding injunctive relief an appropriate remedy for
advertising-related claims under the Lanham Act). In some cases attorney’s fees will also be
awarded in Lanham Act claims. See § 1117; Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp. v. Kooltone, Inc., 649
F.2d 94, 95 (2d Cir. 1981) (acknowledging judges are “given considerable discretion in awarding
reasonable attorney’s fees” under the Lanham Act).
64. See Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146 (1963) (affirming
district court ruling that the regulation of avocado transportation is within California’s police
powers); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905), abrogated as recognized in Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 657 (1887) (discussing
whether an ban on brewing liquor was within a state’s police powers); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S.
113, 125 (1876) (noting that police powers allow for the regulation of personal interactions when
required for the public good). The Constitution created a federal government with limited
powers. See U.S. CONST. art. I (describing the limited enumerated powers of the federal
Congress). The Tenth Amendment specifically states that the “powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the People.” U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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must do so with caution and precision.65 There is a strong presumption against
the preemption of state laws relating to police powers.66 This presumption
applies with particular force to state regulation of food.67 Since the early days
of our nation’s founding, states have exercised this power by enacting various
statutes designed to regulate claims made in food labels.68
2. Relevant Constitutional Preemption Doctrines
Although the federal government holds limited powers, the nation’s
founders provided that “the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme
Law of the Land.”69 The Supremacy Clause has been interpreted to provide
for several forms of preemption of federal law over state law, including field
preemption, conflict preemption, and express preemption.70
a. Field Preemption
Field preemption of a state law is justified when a federal scheme of
regulations is so pervasive that it may be inferred that Congress left the states
no opportunity to add to the body of federal law, where a dominant federal
interest precludes state regulation on the same subject, or where “the object
sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations
imposed by it may reveal the same purpose.”71 Field preemption is based on
the principle that “federal regulation of a field of commerce should not be

65. The Supreme Court has recognized “the assumption that the historic police powers of
the States [are] not to be superseded by [a] Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress. That assumption applies with particular force when Congress has legislated
in a field traditionally occupied by the States.” Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008)
(citations omitted).
66. Id.; see also Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (discussing when
preemption of state law is appropriate); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947) (recognizing that state police powers should not be preempted unless clearly stated by
Congress).
67. See Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U.S. 461, 472 (1894) (noting “[i]f there be any
subject over which it would seem the States ought to have plenary control . . . it is the protection
of the people against fraud and deception in the sale of food products.”).
68. Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly, 95 P.3d 422, 430–32 (Cal. 2004) (discussing various state
laws enacted in Wisconsin, Maryland, Ohio, New York designed to prohibit manufacturer’s
claims intended to mislead consumers).
69. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
70. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190,
203–04 (1983) (noting that Congress may preempt states expressly and by implementing “a
scheme of federal regulation . . . so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress
left no room for States to supplement it,” and also noting that state law may be preempted when it
conflicts with federal law).
71. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
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deemed preemptive of state regulatory power in the absence of persuasive
reasons.”72
Illustrating the limits on this principle is Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State
Energy Resources Conservation & Development Comm’n, in which the
Supreme Court reviewed a federal statute that was passed to promote
development of the privatized nuclear energy industry.73 After the federal law
was passed, California passed a law prohibiting nuclear plant construction until
disposal programs for nuclear waste were put in place.74 The Supreme Court
held that the federal law did not preempt the state law despite the fact that the
federal government occupied the field of nuclear energy.75 The Court noted
that congressional intent left the door open for states to pass laws regulating
atomic energy for economic reasons.76
b. Conflict Preemption
Conflict preemption arises when compliance with both state and federal law
is impossible77 or where state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”78 For instance,
in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, a California law was
enacted that imposed minimum maturity standards on avocados sold in the
state, requiring them to contain at least eight percent oil by weight.79 These
same maturity standards were also imposed on avocados imported from other
states, including Florida, which happened to be the California avocado

72. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963). Justice Story is
often credited with developing the foundations of field preemption in the first half of the
nineteenth century. See, e.g., Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. 102, 153–61 (Story, J.,
dissenting). Justice Story argued that a New York law touching upon the treatment of individuals
arriving into the state via seaports was preempted because only the federal government could
enact laws dealing with interstate commerce. Id. Justice Story noted that attention must be paid
to the “full purpose and effect” of the law in question rather than to its purported goal. Id.; see
also Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 608–26 (1842) (discussing the nature of inherent
Constitutional powers delegated to the federal government and preemption over state laws
touching upon personal liberties of runaway slaves).
73. 461 U.S. at 194–95.
74. Id. at 194.
75. Id. at 220–23 (reasoning that the Atomic Energy Act did not conflict with California’s
nuclear energy law because there is evidence in the legislative history and structure of the
statutory scheme that the Atomic Energy Act, although intended to promote nuclear power, could
accomodate efforts by states to regulate nuclear power development for economic reasons).
76. Id. at 222–23.
77. Fla. Lime, 373 U.S. at 142–43.
78. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66–67 (1941). The Supreme Court first articulated
the doctrine of conflict preemption in 1829. See Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S.
245, 252 (1829) (upholding a Delaware law permitting the construction of a dam across a
navigable stream on grounds the federal government had enacted no laws touching upon such
construction).
79. 373 U.S. at 134.
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growers’ biggest source of competition.80 Florida-grown avocados typically
did not contain more than eight percent oil until after they were no longer
ripe.81 Federal regulations imposed no oil content requirements on avocados
sold to the public.82 Despite the existence of these dual laws, the Supreme
Court held the California law was not preempted by federal law as there was
not “actual conflict between the two schemes of regulation that both cannot
stand in the same area.”83
c. Express Preemption
Express preemption exists where Congress indicates in clear statutory
language that a federal law is intended to preempt state laws on the same
subject.84 However, even where an express preemption clause exists, the court
must still consider the “substance and scope of Congress’ displacement of state
law.” 85 The Supreme Court in Jones v. Rath Packing Co. considered a
California statute that required the net weight of foods, including meats,
packaged for sale not to weigh less than as labeled on their packaging.86 The
Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) and FDA regulations created pursuant to
the Act allows for reasonable variations in weight statements on meat product
labels. 87 The Court held that because the California law did not allow for
reasonable variations in weight claims on meat product labels, it imposed a
requirement different from the FMIA and, therefore, was expressly
preempted.88
C. Relevant California Laws Regulating Food Labeling, Advertising, and
Marketing
California has enacted several statutes regulating food labeling and
advertising including the Sherman Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Law (Sherman
Law), the Unfair Competition Law (UCL), the False Advertising Law (FAL),
and the Consumers Legal Remedy Act (CLRA). 89 Consistent with the
80. Id. at 139–40.
81. Id. at 140.
82. Id. at 134.
83. Id. at 141.
84. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (noting that “when Congress has
‘unmistakably . . . ordained’ . . . that its enactments alone are to regulate a part of commerce, state
laws regulating that aspect of commerce must fall”) (citations omitted).
85. Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008).
86. 430 U.S. at 526. This statute applies to meat products regulated by the U.S. Department
of Agriculture (USDA) under federal statutes. Id. at 528.
87. Id. at 528–30 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 601(n)(5) (2006)). The statute also prohibited states
from enacting “‘[m]arking, labeling, packaging, or ingredient requirements in addition to, or
different than, those made under’ the [FMIA].” Id. at 530 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 678 (2006)).
88. Id. at 530–32.
89. Sherman Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Law, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 109875 et
seq. (West 2012); Unfair Competition Law, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2008);
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requirements of the FFDCA, 90 the Sherman Law imposes labeling
requirements that are functionally identical to federal requirements for artificial
food colorings. 91 The Sherman Law also prohibits the sale of misbranded
food. 92 A food is deemed misbranded if it is advertised in any false or
misleading way.93
Similar in nature to the Lanham Act, the UCL, FAL, and CLRA are
consumer protection-oriented statutes that seek to promote fair competition
through honest advertising.94 The UCL proscribes “‘acts or practices which
are unlawful, or unfair, or fraudulent.’”95 California courts have interpreted
the FAL to prohibit false advertising and “advertising which, although true, is
either actually misleading or which has a capacity, likelihood or tendency to
deceive or confuse the public.”96 Conduct violates the CLRA if it is “‘likely to
mislead a reasonable consumer.’”97 California courts have explained that the
CLRA should be construed liberally to support its goal of protecting
consumers.98

False Advertising Law, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (West 2008); Consumers Legal
Remedy Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750, 1760 & 1770(a)(1)–(22) (West 2009 & Supp. 2013).
90. FFDCA §§ 403A, 21 U.S.C. §§ 343–1 (2006 & Supp. 2012) (permitting states to only
enact statutes that impose labeling requirements that are identical to those specified by federal
law).
91. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 110740 (West 2012) (providing “[a]ny food is
misbranded if it bears or contains any artificial flavoring, artificial coloring, or chemical
preservative, unless its labeling states that fact”) Id. The FFDCA provides in section 403(k) that
a food is misbranded “[i]f it bears or contains any artificial flavoring, artificial coloring, or
chemical preservative, unless it bears labeling stating that fact.” FFDCA § 403(k), 21 U.S.C.
§ 343(k) (2006).
92. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 110765 (West 2012).
93. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 110660 (West 2012).
94. The UCL defines unfair competition to “include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent
business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2008). The CLRA proscribes “[r]epresenting that goods or services
are of a particular standard, quality, or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if
they are of another.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 1770(a)(7) (West 2009 & Supp. 2013). The FAL
provides “[i]t is unlawful to make or disseminate or cause to be made or disseminated before the
public in this state…any statement . . . which is untrue or misleading, and which is known, or
which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be untrue or misleading.” CAL.
BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (West 2008).
95. O’Donovan v. CashCall, Inc., 278 F.R.D. 479, 499 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting Cel-Tech
Commc’n, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527, 540 (Cal. 1999)) (noting further that a
practice need not be unfair and unlawful or deceptive and unlawful for the practice to be
prohibited).
96. Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1193 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (quoting
Leoni v. State Bar, 704 P.2d 183, 194) (Cal. 1985)).
97. Wilson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 668 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Colgan v.
Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 38 Cal. Rptr.3d 36, 46 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)).
98. See Keegan v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 838 F. Supp. 2d 929, 938 (C.D. Cal. 2012)
(quoting Colgan, 38 Cal. Rptr.3d at 46).
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D. The In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases and Pom Wonderful LLC v.
Coca-Cola Co. Litigations
1. In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases
In 2008 the California Supreme Court considered a consolidated
consumer-driven class action lawsuit, known as the In re Farm Raised Salmon
Cases litigation, which was brought against several grocery stores. 99
Consumers had purchased farm-raised salmon that had been treated with
chemicals called astaxanthin and canthaxanthin.100 These chemicals allegedly
act as a coloring agent to the flesh of the salmon, turning the flesh from grey to
pink and orange/red.101 The plaintiff argued that the grocery stores failed to
label the packaged salmon as containing food coloring.102
The plaintiffs sought relief under several statutes: the UCL, CLRA, and the
FAL.103 The California Supreme Court found the FFDCA did not preempt the
plaintiff’s cause of action.104 Notably, the court was unwilling to hold that
section 310 of the FFDCA precluded the private cause of action because the
basis of the claim was not the FFDCA, but rather state statutes.105
2. Pom Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola
Four years after the In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases decision, the Ninth
Circuit considered a similar claim in Pom Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co.106
The plaintiff, Pom Wonderful, a manufacturer of pomegranate juice, brought
suit alleging that Coca-Cola misled consumers through false labeling of a juice
blend drink sold under the Minute Maid brand.107 The Minute Maid beverage
was labeled as “pomegranate blueberry” juice despite the fact it contained
minimal amounts of pomegranate and blueberry juice.108
99. In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, 175 P.3d 1170, 1173 (Cal. 2008). The appeals courts
upheld the district court’s decision to sustain the defendant’s motion to dismiss. Id. at 1173.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1174. The plaintiffs contended, “the color of salmon is an indication of its origin,
quality, freshness, flavor, and other characteristics.” Id. at 1173.
102. Id. at 1173.
103. Id. at 1173. In order to make a valid claim under the UCL, one must allege the business
practice in question is unlawful. Id. at 1174. The plaintiffs relied on the provision in the
Sherman Act requiring disclosure of food colorings to allege a violation of the “unlawful” prong
of their UCL violation claim. See id. at 1174 (implying that satisfaction of an “unlawful” prong is
required to make a UCL claim); see also supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text.
104. In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, 175 P.3d at 1184.
105. Id. at 1173.
106. 679 F.3d 1170, 1172 (9th Cir. 2012).
107. Id. at 1173–74.
108. See id. at 1173 (noting that Coca-Cola’s beverage contained “about 99.4% apple and
grape juices, 0.3% pomegranate juice, 0.2% blueberry juice, and 0.1% raspberry juice”). The
Coca-Cola product’s front label “displays the product’s name and a vignette depicting each of
those fruits.” Id.
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Like the plaintiffs from the In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases litigation, Pom
Wonderful predicated a portion of its claim on California state statutes
including the UCL and FAL.109 However, the court refused to consider the
merits of these state claims due to lack of standing.110 Pom Wonderful also
brought suit under the Lanham Act’s false-advertising provision.111 The court
interpreted the FFDCA as broadly preempting Pom Wonderful’s Lanham Act
claims given that Coca-Cola’s beverage seemingly complied with the
FFDCA.112
II. CURRENT FEDERAL AND STATE STATUTES HAVE CREATED A CONFUSING
BODY OF LAW APPLICABLE TO FOOD AND BEVERAGE PRODUCT LABELING
A. Creative Private Litigants Have Found Ways to Engage the FFDCA
Congress left the states some leeway to enforce their own laws concerning
food and beverage products when it enacted the NLEA, but the current
regulatory scheme has produced a highly complex body of case law.113 On the
one hand, Congress manifested its clear intent that only the government should
be able to enforce the FFDCA when it enacted section 310 in 1938. 114
Congress also made it clear in section 403A that states may not mandate
labeling requirements that are not identical to the federal food labeling
provisions for food colorings or products subject to a standard of identity.115
On the other hand, states such as California have adhered to this congressional
109. Id. at 1174.
110. Id. at 1178–79 (stating at the time of the district court’s ruling, it was unclear if one
needed to be eligibile for restitution in order to bring suit under California’s UCL and FAL).
111. Id. at 1174 (noting that Pom Wonderful alleged various violations of California state
statutes).
112. Id. at 1175–77 (affirming the district court’s holding that the FFDCA barred Pom’s
Lanham Act claim and noting that FFDCA limits the circumstances under which plaintiffs can
bring Lanham Act claims, imposing restrictions even in circumstances where the FDA has not
found that a specific act violates the FFDCA). In arriving at its decision, the court relied on
PhotoMedex, Inc. v. Irwin, in which the Ninth Circuit held the FFDCA barred a Lanham Act
claim against a medical device manufacturer alleging that the manufacturer marketed a device as
approved by the FDA when the FDA had not yet seen the device because the FFDCA allowed the
manufacturer some leeway in determining whether the device was actually cleared and the FDA
had not yet declared whether there was a violation. Id. at 1176 (citing PhotoMedex, Inc. v. Irwin,
601 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2010)). The basis of this holding centered on an FDA regulation that
enabled manufacturers to make such claims absent FDA review if the manufacturer believed their
device was sufficiently similar to another device that had been approved by the FDA.
PhotoMedex, 601 F.3d at 924–26.
113. See 136 CONG. REC. 20418 (July 30, 1990) (statement of Rep. Waxman) (discussing the
need for states to have leeway to enact their own labeling laws).
114. See FFDCA § 310, 21 U.S.C. § 337(a) (2006) (stating that the FFDCA’s default rule
gives enforcement power solely to the federal government, except where explicitly stated to the
contrary).
115. See FFDCA § 403A(a)(1) & 403A(a)(3), 21 U.S.C. § 343–1(a)(1) & § 343–1(a)(3)
(2006 & Supp. 2012).
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dictate and enacted statutes with labeling requirements materially identical to
those in the FFDCA. 116 Private parties have used these statutes to bring
lawsuits under the guise of other consumer protection statutes (such as the
UCL, FAL, and CLRA) creating an environment where, in essence, private
litigants are enforcing the FFDCA in state courts.117 Additional federal laws,
such as the Lanham Act, intersect with the scope of activity regulated by the
FFDCA, further blurring the issue.118
B. In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases and the Enforcement of State Laws
Identical to the FFDCA by Private Parties: When Does Section 337 Apply?
The plaintiffs in In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases sought relief under state
statutes even though they were likely aware that the FFDCA contains
provisions regulating food-coloring labeling,119 vests enforcement power over
claims relating to food coloring in the government alone, 120 and preempts
states from enacting any labeling laws that are not identical to the FFDCA.121
As such, the plaintiffs sought to have the court read their complaint as solely
predicated on state law claims. 122 According to the plaintiffs, FFDCA
preemption of their private cause of action could only apply if the claim itself
was based on a state law imposing labeling requirements that were not
identical to those specified in the FFDCA.123

116. Compare CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 110740 (West 2012) with 21 U.S.C.
§ 343(k) (2006).
117. See, e.g., Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., 552 F.3d 934, 936, 940 (9th Cir. 2008)
(holding a private litigant suit brought under the UCL, CLRA, and FAL was not preempted by the
FFDCA); Fraker v. KFC Corp., No. 06-CV-01284-JM (WMC), 2007 WL 1296571, at *3–4 (S.D.
Cal. Apr. 30, 2007) (finding a private litigant suit brought under the UCL, FAL and CLRA was
preempted by the FFDCA); Chacanaca v. Quaker Oats Co., 752 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1117–19 (N.D.
Cal. 2010) (holding that to the extent a food manufacturer’s packaging was subject to FDA
regulation and compliant with the FFDCA, a private litigant suit brought under the FAL, UCL,
CLRA, and Lanham Act was preempted by the FFDCA).
118. See THEODORE H. DAVIS JR. & JORDAN S. WEINSTEIN, TRADEMARK LAW HANDBOOK
§ 14.08, at 590 (2011) (noting that “[l]awsuits by innovator pharmaceutical companies
challenging claims by competitors that the competitors’ generic pharmaceutical products are
equivalent to those of the innovator companies have required courts to address the relationship
between the Lanham Act, on the one hand, and the FDCA, on the other”). Id. at 590. See also
Schering-Plough Healthcare Prod., Inc. v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 586 F.3d 500, 503–06 (7th Cir.
2009) (addressing both the FFDCA and the Lanham Act in a prescription drug labeling suit).
119. FFDCA § 403(k), 21 U.S.C. § 343 (k) (2006). In determining which colorings had to be
labeled under the NLEA regulations, the FDA decided color additives “not subject to certification
may be declared ‘Artificial Color’, ‘Artificial Color Added’, or ‘Color Added. ’” 21 C.F.R.
§ 101.22 (2012).
120. FFDCA § 310, 21 U.S.C. § 337 (2006).
121. FFDCA § 403A(a), 21 U.S.C. § 343–1(a).
122. Brief for Appellant at 20–30, In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, 175 P.3d 1170 (Cal.
2008) (No. B182901).
123. Id. at 23–25.
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The California Supreme Court found the plaintiffs’ arguments persuasive
and held that the FFDCA does not preclude this private cause of action because
the basis of the claim was not the FFDCA, but rather state statutes.124 The
court began its analysis by noting the strong constitutional presumption against
After
preemption of state laws advancing police power functions. 125
considering the express preemption provisions codified in the NLEA, the court
concluded that Congress intended these provisions to be narrowly applied.126
The court noted the express preemption language in the FFDCA cannot be
construed to impliedly preempt state claims on the basis that they stand as an
obstacle congressional purpose.127
C. Pom Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co.: Enforcement of Lanham Act
Claims Predicated on Food or Beverage Labels by Private Parties and
Section 310’s Preemptive Purview
In considering the plaintiff’s Lanham Act claims, the Ninth Circuit in Pom
Wonderful began its analysis by noting that the FDA has issued standard of
identity regulations detailing how a beverage manufacturer may market its
juice products.128 The court then construed these regulations in light of section
310, noting that only that the government may enforce a violation the
FFDCA.129 Faced with these apparently competing areas of positive law, the
court interpreted the FFDCA as broadly preempting the Lanham Act claims.130
Specifically, the court found that “allowing such a suit would undermine
Congress’s decision to limit enforcement of the FDCA to the government” and
“would require a court originally to interpret ambiguous FDA regulations,
because rendering such an interpretation would usurp the FDA’s interpretive
124. In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, 175 P.3d at 1181–82.
125. Id. at 1176; see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (quoting Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)) (explaining that the Court presumes that
Congress “does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action,” but assumes that state police
power has not been superceded by Congress unless the purpose to do so is clearly mandated).
126. In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, 175 P.3d at 1179 (stating that “Congress, in light of
the history of dual state-federal cooperation in this area, did not intend to limit states’ options in a
broad fashion; . . . the preemption provision at issue here, section 343–1, demonstrates Congress’s
care in deciding what to preempt and what to allow.”).
127. Id. at 1179. The appeals court, when considering the defendant’s motion to dismiss,
found that because the Sherman Law food coloring labeling requirements are virtually identical to
those specified in the FFDCA, and explained that, “[t]o allow a private person to prosecute a state
law private right of action based on a violation of the FDCA would interfere with that
governmental prosecutorial discretion and federal government oversight and conflict with the
clear congressional intent to provide for a comprehensive and exclusive governmental
enforcement scheme.” In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 449, 455 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006).
128. 679 F.3d 1170, 1175 (9th Cir. 2012); see also 21 C.F.R. § 102.33(c)–(d) (2012)
(providing the regulations pertinent in Pom Wonderful).
129. Pom Wonderful, 679 F.3d at 1175.
130. Id.
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authority.”131 This reasoning seems to be grounded in multiple preemption
doctrines.132
III. RECONCILING IN RE FARM RAISED SALMON CASES WITH POM
WONDERFUL LLC
A. Can In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases and Pom Wonderful LLC Be
Distinguished on the Basis of the Statutes in Question?
The holdings in In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases and Pom Wonderful LLC
beg the question: are the two cases distinguishable based on differences
between the statutes at issue in each case? Pom Wonderful dealt with
competing federal statutes: the FFDCA and the Lanham Act.133 The Lanham
Act contains no preemption provision. Therefore, it seems that it is facially
justifiable to conclude that the FFDCA’s preemption provisions hold
considerable weight. 134 Conversely, In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases
concerned competing state and federal statutes in the FFDCA and the Sherman
Law, UCL, FAL, and CLRA.135 Courts are bound to respect the traditional
police power functions inherently delegated to the states by the Constitution136
and the particularly strong presumption against preemption that governs state
laws regulating food. 137 Therefore, since the Sherman Law in In re Farm
Raised Salmon Cases was materially identical to the FFDCA, the California
Supreme Court could not find an adequate justification to support either
express or implied preemption.138

131. Id. at 1175–76.
132. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “usurpation” as “[t]he unlawful seizure and assumption
of another’s position, office, or authority.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1685 (9th ed. 2009). The
court in Pom Wonderful also utilized the term “undermine” in its analysis. 679 F.3d at 1175–76.
These operative terms indicate the court utilized field, conflict and express preemption doctrines
to justify the holding. See Parts I.B.1 & 2 and accompanying text (discussing when field,
conflict, and express preemption are applicable).
133. 679 F.3d at 1174.
134. This contention garners additional support in light of more recent cases arguing the Pom
Wonderful’s holding regarding preemption should be narrowly construed. See Khasin v. Hershey
Co., 2012 WL 5471153, at *8–9 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2012) (citing Pom Wonderful, 679 F.3d at
1176–79) (interpreting the Pom Wonderful court’s holding to mean that the FFDCA preempts the
Lanham Act only where the claim implicates the express preemption provisions of the FFDCA,
but noting that the FFDCA does not necessarily preempt claims brought under state consumer
protection statutes even when the claim touches upon the express preemption provisions of the
FFDCA).
135. 175 P.3d 1170, 1173–74 (Cal. 2008).
136. See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (noting a strong
presumption against preemption applies to state laws touching upon police powers of the state).
137. See Plumley v. Massachusetts., 155 U.S. 461, 472 (1894).
138. In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, 175 P.3d at 1178–80.

1082

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 62:1061

B. Additional Case Law Suggests In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases and Pom
Wonderful LLC Cannot Be Distinguished on the Basis of the Statutes in
Question
While material distinctions may be drawn when conducting a narrow review
of just In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases and Pom Wonderful LLC, deeper
examination of the relevant caselaw reveals courts have difficulty in applying
these same legal concepts.139 For instance, in Williams v. Gerber Products
Co., the court reviewed a class action lawsuit filed against the manufacturer of
fruit juice snacks for toddlers.140 The product label contained pictures of fruit
allegedly not present in the juice. 141 The plaintiffs stated that the product
violated the UCL, CLRA, and the FAL.142 The district court dismissed the suit
on grounds that the label would not deceive a “reasonable consumer.” 143
Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit held that although the product complied with
FDA regulations regarding juice products labeling, the product could
nevertheless be considered deceptive to consumers under the UCL and
remanded the case for further proceedings.144
Several months prior to the In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases decision, a
federal court in California issued a conflicting opinion.145 In Fraker v. KFC
139. See Food Labeling; Mandatory Status of Nutrition Labeling and Nutrient Content
Revision, 55 Fed. Reg. 29487, 29509 (July 19, 1990) (explaining that, “[t]he preemption issue is
complex and divisive: whether a uniform, national label is necessary for consumers and
manufacturers to function in the marketplace versus whether States should be permitted to require
additional information for their residents,” and noting that state and consumer input is
“essential”).
140. 552 F.3d 934, 936 (9th Cir. 2008).
141. Id. at 936. The product in question was fruit juice snacks targeted towards toddlers aged
2–3. Id. at 936. The package label contained pictures of oranges, peaches, strawberries, and
cherries. Id. The label also stated the product was made with “real fruit juice and natural
ingredients.” Id. In actuality, the product contained only white grape juice from concentrate. Id.
142. Id.
143. Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., 439 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1116 (S.D. Cal. 2006).
144. Williams, 552 F.3d at 940 (rejecting the defendant’s claim that the product complied
with the FFDCA and therefore shielded the defendants from liability under the California state
statutes). It appears that the Williams court’s holding was based, at least in part, on the
defendants’ failure to properly make the “shielding” argument before the District Court and their
failure to show how an FFDCA compliant label might shield the defendants from liability under
the California state statutes. Id. In Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., the Third Circuit reviewed a
similar case in which a consumer brought suit under a New Jersey consumer protection fraud
statute against a beverage manufacturer that claimed that the beverage was “natural.” 575 F.3d
329, 332–33 (3d Cir. 2009). FDA guidance established an informal policy for such a claim based
in part on the product’s ingredient content and manufacturing process. Id. at 340. The court
found the FFDCA and other pertinent regulations did not expressly or impliedly preempt the state
statute because the FDA had only issued a “policy statement” on the use of the word “natural,”
which could not overcome the presumption against federal preemption of state statutes enforcing
police powers. Id. at 342.
145. Fraker v. KFC Corp., No. 06-CV-01284-JM (WMC), 2007 WL 1296571, at *4–5 (S.D.
Cal. Apr. 30, 2007).
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Corp., the court considered a consumer class action suit initiated against a
large restaurant chain.146 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated the
UCL, FAL, and CLRA. 147 The complaint also alleged that the defendant
misbranded food in violation of the Sherman Law and FFDCA.148 The court
found that allowing the state tort claim to proceed, despite the fact that the
matter was within the jurisdiction of the FFDCA, “would significantly increase
the burdens on the FDA to ensure uniform enforcement of its administrative
duties,” and held that “such claims are impliedly preempted by the FFDCA.”149
The District of Columbia District Court reached a similar result in Mills v.
Giant of Maryland, LLC where lactose intolerant plaintiffs filed suit against a
grocery store because milk sold in the grocery store did not contain a warning
that the product contained lactose.150 The plaintiffs alleged that the grocery
store’s failure to warn consumers that milk contained lactose resulted in
personal injury.151 The court took note of the express preemption provisions of
the FFDCA and noted that milk was subject to a standard of identity defined
by FDA regulations.152 The court also noted that the FDA reserves the right to
determine which additives pose safety concerns and thereby require product
labeling.153 As such, the court applied the FFDCA’s preemption provisions
broadly, precluding the plaintiffs’ claims.154
In Chacanaca v. Quaker Oats Co., a federal court in California considered
several claims by a class of California consumers against a food manufacturer
on the basis that labels and promotional material appearing on the packaging of
the manufacturer’s snack bars violated the FAL, UCL, CLRA, and Lanham
Act. 155 The packaging material at issue made several nutrient content and

146. Id. at *1.
147. Id. at *1–2.
148. Id. at *3. The plaintiffs specifically alleged the defendant’s food was high in trans fats
and that trans fats were not safe. Id. at *1. The plaintiffs also challenged the veracity of the
defendant’s advertising statements. Id. at *1–2. Those advertisements included phrases such as
“KFC . . . provides the ‘best food’” and “[t]he good news is that all foods can fit into a balanced
eating plan. . . . [y]ou can enjoy ‘fast food’ as part of a sensible balanced diet.”
149. Id. at *4.
150. 441 F. Supp. 2d 104, 105 (D.D.C. 2006), aff’d, 508 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
151. Id. at 105.
152. Id. at 106–07.
153. Id. at 110; see also FFDCA § 403(q)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(1) (2006 & Supp. 2012)
(specifying what nutritional information must be contained on a food product label and allowing
the Secretary of the FDA to require certain labels to contain certain information or to require that
certain information on labels be highlighted).
154. Mills, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 108 (stating that “a warning label of the nature requested by
plaintiffs would far exceed the labeling requirements mandated by the standard of identity
established by [FDA regulation]” and rejecting “the contention that a label with either of the
warnings suggested by plaintiffs is ‘identical’ to a label without these warnings”).
155. 752 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1114 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (noting that the consumers argued that
statements made by the defendant on its packaging were misleading and untrue).
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health claims. 156 The court noted that the defendant’s health and nutrient
content claims were subject to FDA regulation under the NLEA amendments
to the FFDCA.157 Furthermore, the court took note of the NLEA preemption
provisions that are applicable to such claims. 158 The court dismissed the
consumers’ claims on the grounds that the manufacturer’s packaging was
subject to FDA regulation and was compliant with the FFDCA.159
The Williams decision may be narrowly viewed as consistent with the In re
Farm Raised Salmon Cases court’s decision because the Williams court
allowed the plaintiff’s claims to proceed. However, the Williams court was not
addressing any claims by the plaintiff that the fruit snack manufacturer violated
the Sherman Law.160 Hence, section 310’s preemptive purview was not before
the court in the same manner as it was in In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases.161
The Fraker, Mills, and Chacanaca decisions are harder to reconcile with In re
Farm Raised Salmon Cases and Pom Wonderful. Like the plaintiffs in the In
re Farm Raised Salmon Cases litigation, the Fraker and Chacanaca court
considered claims brought under the UCL, FAL, CLRA and Sherman Law.162
Applying virtually the same positive law as the court in In re Farm Raised
Salmon Cases, the Fraker court determined that the state law claims were
impliedly preempted under the doctrine of field preemption. 163 The
Chacanaca court found that the FFDCA expressly preempted the state law
claims because the state claims were based on food labels and corresponding

156. The manufacturer labeled its product as containing no trans fats, and claimed that its
Chewy Bars were “‘wholesome,’” “‘a good source of calcium and fiber,’” and contained “‘no
high fructose corn syrup.’” Id. at 1115. The packaging also contained images of “oats, nuts, and
children in soccer uniforms.” Id.
157. FFDCA section 403 specifies the information that must be disclosed on a food label.
FFDCA § 403, 21 U.S.C. § 343. Corresponding regulations mandate disclosure of trans fat
content only if the trans fat is present in an amount greater than 0.5 grams per serving. 21 C.F.R.
§ 101.9(c)(2)(ii) (2012). FFDCA section 343(r) specifies the requirements for making health and
nutrient content claims. FFDCA § 403(r), 21 U.S.C. § 343(r). The relevant regulations are
located at 21 C.F.R. § 101.13 for nutrient content claims and at 21 C.F.R. § 101.14 for health
claims. 21 C.F.R. § 101.13–14 (2012).
158. Chacanaca, 752 F. Supp. 2d at 1118 (referring to FFDCA § 403A(a)(4)–(5), 21 U.S.C.
343–1(a)(4)–(5) (2006 & Supp. 2012)).
159. Chacanaca, 752 F. Supp. 2d at 1127. The court noted that claims regarding
promotional material on the front of the product’s packaging that was not subject to FDA
regulations were not preempted by the FFDCA. Id. at 1123–24. The court also dismissed the
Lanham Act claim on the grounds that the consumers did not have standing to bring such a claim
because they were not competitors with the defendant. Id. at 1126–27.
160. See Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., 552 F.3d 934, 936 (9th Cir. 2008).
161. See id. at 940 (explaining that the defendant did not argue how it would be shielded
from liability under California law by complying with FDA regulations).
162. Chacanaca, 752 F. Supp. 2d at 1114; Fraker v. KFC Corp., No. 06-CV-01284-JM
(WMC), 2007 WL 1296571, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2007).
163. Fraker, 2007 WL 1296571 at *4.
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promotional materials that were compliant with federal law.164 Similarly, like
the court in In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases, the Mills court considered a
state-labeling requirement for a food product subject to a standard of identity
under federal law. 165 Yet the Mills court reached a contrary decision,
determining that the FFDCA broadly preempted state labeling claims.166 The
Fraker, Chacanaca, and Mills decisions suggest that the nature of the statute in
question—whether it is a state statute or a competing federal statute—cannot
justify the divergent holdings in In re Farm Raised Salmon Cases and Pom
Wonderful.
C. Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen: Uniformity is Needed to Foster a
Predictable Legal Environment for Consumers and Manufacturers
The current enforcement paradigm features a host of players whose
oversight roles overlap.167 The FDA is aware of the states’ authority to enact
their own labeling and advertising statutes, but has not clarified the scope of its
regulations.168 Concurrently, state courts are willing to facilitate litigation filed
by consumers with causes of action inherently predicated on food and beverage
labeling violations.169 State and federal courts are stuck with the unenviable
task of squaring these somewhat divergent interests when lawsuits invoke
issues that are addressed by the FFDCA but are facially pled on other grounds.
To date, the judicial system has struggled with this task. 170 Can a
non-FFDCA based claim be preempted by the FFDCA if the pleadings give
rise to an FFDCA violation? Is implied field preemption of the FFDCA ever
applicable to state law claims? The existing legal environment offers
164. Chacanaca, 752 F. Supp. 2d at 1127. Notably, the court stated the “plaintiffs’ deception
claims may only go forward if they can show that the statements would also be ‘misbranded’
under the terms of the [FFDCA].” Id. at 1119.
165. Mills v. Giant of Md., 441 F. Supp. 2d at 106–07 (D.D.C. 2006), aff’d, 508 F.3d 11
(D.C. Cir. 2007).
166. Id. at 108.
167. See Fortin, supra note 5, at 4 (identifying the various government entities charged with
enforcement oversight of food and beverage labeling and advertising including state legislatures
and regulatory agencies, Congress, the FDA, and the courts); see also Schaffer, supra note 11, at
371–72 (discussing the complex and disjointed regulation of the food industry).
168. See Food Labeling; Mandatory Status of Nutrition Labeling and Nutrient Content
Revision, 55 Fed. Reg. 29487, 29509 (July 19, 1990) (admitting that the preemption of state laws
touching upon food and beverage labels is a confusing subject).
169. See supra note 117 (noting several cases where courts have considered private litigant
claims facially pleaded under consumer protection statutes but dependent on food labeling
violations subject to enforcement solely by the government).
170. Compare Red v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1142–44 (C.D. Cal. 2010)
(treating statements made about vegetables as ingredient claims on a label and not impliedly
preempted under the FDCA) with Dvora v. Gen. Mills, Inc., No. CV 11-1074-GW (PLAx), 2011
WL 1897349, at *5–6 (C.D. Cal. May 16, 2011) (distinguishing the Kraft Foods, Inc. holding by
treating statements made about particular fruits as flavor claims on a label, which are impliedly
preempted under the FDCA).
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insufficient guidance on these questions and many more. 171 Therefore,
Congress should develop a workable statutory scheme that expands the
FFDCA’s preemption provisions.
Specifically, the FFDCA should prohibit all private entity lawsuits if the
underlying facts supporting the claim rely on information contained on the
product’s label that is subject to the FFDCA preemption provisions. It is
possible that this course of action would generate more litigation; however, it
is necessary to clarify the current conflicting state and federal laws so that
manufacturers can know what regulations they are subject to and potential
consumer litigants can understand when they can bring a private suit. This
approach will also enable states to continue to enforce FFDCA violations
under section 310 thereby preserving their traditional police power functions.
It will also prevent private parties from bringing lawsuits inherently predicated
on food labeling violations but facially pleaded on other grounds.172 However,
given the creativity the plaintiff’s bar has shown to date, the suggested
approach may offer only temporary and limited benefits.173
IV. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the status quo is unacceptable because it creates hardships for
both consumers and food manufacturers. Consumers are left unsure of their
rights to take issue with perceived food and beverage labeling violations and
businesses are forced to operate in an uncertain legal environment and face
high costs to defend litigation. Although a products’ labeling may be
compliant with the FFDCA, it may nevertheless be subject to legal action in
some states, forcing manufacturers to be hyper-vigilant and misdirect valuable
resources. Therefore, Congress should act to prohibit all private entity lawsuits
if the underlying facts supporting the claim rely on information contained on
the product’s label that is subject to the FFDCA preemption provisions.

171. See supra note 169.
172. However, court battles will likely be waged following enactment of such a provision.
The scope of a new provision prohibiting private litigants from bringing suit will need to be either
carefully expressed in the new statute or in subsequent regulations enacted by FDA. For instance,
courts may struggle to determine when the underlying facts supporting a private litigant’s claim
sufficiently rely on information contained on the product’s label such that it should be prohibited.
In addition, some court challenges would likely be focused on the Constitutional authority of
Congress to pass a law which expands federal oversight of an area arguably within the police
powers authority of the states. See Plumley v. Massachusetts., 155 U.S. 461, 472 (1894) (noting
that the regulation of food products is a core police power belonging to the states).
173. Food and beverage manufacturers under the proposed paradigm will only enjoy
prohibition of private litigant suits subject to express preemption under FFDCA section 403A.
See FFDCA § 403A(a)(1)–(5), 21 U.S.C. § 343–1(a)(1)–(5) (2006 & Supp. 2012). Private
litigants would likely pursue litigation strategies with claims predicated on food label information
not subject to preemption under FFDCA section 403A. Regardless, this approach would still
provide at least some additional clarity to industry and consumers about their legal rights.

